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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
E. J.

and RALPH DuNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

HUBER

Case No. 69166

vs.
VICTOR NEWMAN'

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT
The plaintiffs and respondents in their Amended
Complaint alleged that on or about the fore part of April,
1942, the plaintiffs and defendant entered into an oral
agreement in which they agreed to enter into the contracting business and make bids and accept certain jobs
in the intermountain area. That pursuant to this agreement the plaintiffs and defendant accepted certain jobs
in the intermountain area and completed the same, the
agreement further providing that the profits, if any, to
'be derived from any work to be divided one-third each.
That if anybody furnished machinery or trucks that they
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2
were to receive rental therefor, the same as any third
party. Piilfrtti:tf.s :fhrth~t ahegell that th~t cari.·i~d. on
said business uhtl~r this afrarig~me:ht on various jobs,
and that the defendant had refused to account on certain
of these jobs, namely, the Railroad Job, the Hospital
Jo:b and the Harrison-Dorman Job~ That the pUiintiffs ,
and respondents introduced evidence in support of their
allegations in the said Amended Complaint. Evidence
was Hitrodtwed that these parties entered into an agreement which they termed a partnership, and which the
court found to be a joint adventure. That although the
~efendant and appellant, u:rider oath,
these allegations, alleging that the relationship on these particular projects was that of employee-employer, nevertheles·s, through his counsel, admitted that the relationship was that of a joint adventure. (Tr. 250-251) The
court after determining that a joint adventure existed,
then proceeded to ail a:C(ilili:fi.ting between the parties.
It appointed as a referee Mr. Wallace Dansie, who made
hi~ rep<>rt t~ the court Th~ cburt aprrroved pr~rcHcally
all of th~ report. Th~ plaintiffs afid reS·pbhd~rtts t~on
bmded that certain portions r;f the report were in
and put on evidence to sustain th~ir ~o:hfention that the
referee should have report~d that more cubi~ yards of
d~rt had been put in th~ jdb known tts the Ht)s{>ital Jon
tlian that as submitted in his repbrt; Eihibit "E''. Th~
court adopted the r-eport with the inodi:fieatibn of the
e"\ridence sublnitted in re·spect to the alhotin t of ~uibin
yards of dirt as put into the job known a:s tne ''Ht;~Spital
Job.'' The cohrt then rend~ fed judgrnent in fitvor ot

aenie.a

error,
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3
the plaintiffs and respondents and against the defendant
and appellant in the sum of $19,451.03 as the a1nount due
and owing from the defendant and appellant to these
plaintiffs and respondents. The ·court ·before entering
judgment had the referee, Mr. Dansie, testify in respect
to the report. The defendant and appellant made no
objections to the filing of the findings of the referee,
nor did he file or make objections to the same. He also
had ample opportunity to question Mr. Dansie on the
findings.
ARGUMENT
These Respondents will answer the Assignments of
Error as referred to in Defendant '·s and Appellant's
Brief in the order in which they appear. The Defendant's and Appellant's First Assignment of Error is as
follows:
''The District Court had no jurisdiction to proceed to an accounting of the affairs of an alleged
partnership until it has first judicially determined
the existence of such partnership upon adequate
evidence within the issues, and until after it has
entered an appealable decree that defendant
account.''
In support of this assignment, the defendant and appellant relies upon the Utah ease of Rozelle v. Third Judicial District Court, 39 P. (2d) 1113. We refer this court
to the Utah case of Gibbs v. District Court of .the Third
Judicial District, 44 P. (2d) 504. The plaintiff in the
Gilb'bs case soug~t to set aside assignments of certain
mortgages and other documents connected therewith,
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and have an accounting of all moneys received by the defendant by reason of such assignments. The District
Court decided the issue in favor of the plaintiff, that the
assignment should he set aside. The court then directed
an accounting without making any Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, or Decree. The defendant contended that the trial court was without jurisdiction to
proceed with the accounting until it had made Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and had made and entered its Decree adjudging plaintiff in the lower court
entitled to the property; further, defendant contended
that he was entitled to have that issue fully determined
by the trial court on appeal before he could be required
to su1bmit his books to inspection in an accounting procedure. The facts in this case are in ·substance identical
with that before us. T.his court in the Gi·bbs case held
that when a court of equity assumed jurisdiction to determine whether assignment contracts should be set
aside, ordinarily has jurisdiction to settle the controversy, and if it finds contracts void, it then had the
right to require an accounting of moneys received by
the defendant during the time the property was in his
possession, and had the further power to enter judgment
for any amount found to be collected for which the plaintiff below was entitled. This court further held that in
a suit to set aside a·ssignment contracts and to recover
property assigned and moneys collected thereon, court
had jurisdiction to direct accounting, without first making Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entering Decree adjudging plaintiff entitled to property in
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suit. The court resolved the question involved as follows:
"In a suit of this kind, is it the duty which the
court expressly enjoins on a trial court to first
enter judgment as to all matters iin bar of the
accounting- before he can proceed to finish the case
by directing an accounting and adjudicating the
amount shown to he due in such an accounting~"
The court answers that question by saying that such
procedure is not required by any statute or by any decisions of this court. The court further differentiates
the Rozzelle case, and expressly holds that the Rozzelle
case does not have a contrary finding to that of the Gibbs
case.
The rule as expressed 1by this court is the rule of
other jurisdictions. See :

Schesfski v. Anker, 15 P. (2d) 746;
Fox v. Hall, 128 P. 749;
Hallahan v. Sowers, 11 A. 263;
Smith v. Smith, 101 N. Y. S. 521.
RESPONDENTS' SECOND AssiGNMENT oF ERROR

Defendant and appellant contends that there is no
finding responsive to paragra·phs one and two, alleging
partnership, and paragraphs three and four, alleging
breaches of duty in the Amended Complaint. The plaintiffs and respondents in their Amended Complaint alleged that the 'Plaintiffs and defendant entered into an
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oral agreement in which they agreed to enter into the
contracting bus,ines·s and accept certain bids for certain
work to ·be done in the intermountain area. Paragraph
two of the Amended Complaint further ·set forth the
fact that during the fore part of April, 1942, these plaintiffs and the defendant carried on and continued to
carry on said business, and set forth the jobs which were
uncompleted. It further set forth the fact that the jobs
enumerated were undertaken lby the plaintiffs and defendant jointly. The court in its Findings of Fact, paragraph one, recited in substance, that which was alleged
by the plaintiffs in paragraphs one and two of their
Amended Complaint. It certainly is responsive.
Paragraph three of the Amended Complaint recites
as follows:
''That these plaintiffs have at all times and in all
things duly conformed to their understandings
and done their part in all respects in accorandce
~th said understandings."
The findings as set forth in paragraph three of the Findings of Fact provide as follows:
''That these plaintiffs have at all time·s and in all
things duly conformed to their understandings
and done their part in all respects in accordance
with said understandings.''
How could a finding be more responsive to an allegation?
Finding number four specifically sets ferth that the
said defendant, Victor N ewm.an, refused to account for
moneys received and expended in respect to the jobs set
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forth. The emuplaint alleged that the defendant refused
to account for 1noneys received. Paragraph four of the
findings further sets forth that there was no definite
term agreed upon between the parties of the said joint
adventure. The finding is responsive to the allegations
in paragraph four of the complaint.
The appellant further contends that there is no finding responsive to the negative issues contained in the
first defense of the .appellant. The first defense of the
appellant as set forth in its Amended Answer and Counterclaim is that the Amended Complaint does not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This question was raised on Demurrer, and the court overruled
the Demurrer of the defendant and the matter was disposed of. The fact that the eourt finds the material allegations of the complaint in favor of the plaintiffs and
awards a judgment thereon is the same as stating that
there is a cause of action ~in favor of the plaintiffs and
against this defendant. It certainly is not necessary for
. the court in its findings to set forth the fact that the
Amended Complaint does state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The finding in favor of the
plaintiffs is ·sufficient.
The appellant further contends that there is no
finding responsive to paragraphs one, two, three and
four of the appellant's third defense and counterclaim.
The appellant in said paragraphs does nothing more
than allege that the relationship between the respondents
and appellant in the transactions as set forth, both in
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the Amended Complaint and Amended Answer and Counterclainl, was that of employer-employee and not one of
a joint adventure or partnership. Further, he alleges
in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim that the acts
of these respondents on said transactions were in breach
of the contractual relationship, that is, that of master
and servant (employer-employee) ; that the actions of
the respondents were contrary to their agreement. The
court in its findings sets forth the fact that the relationship on the transactions involved was that of a joint
adventure, thereby negativing the contention of the appellant that the relationship was that of ma·ster and servant. It is not necessary for the court in making the find ..
ing that the relationship on the transactions involved
was that of a joint adventure to set forth in negative
terms that the relationship was not that of master and
servant. By its .statement that it was a joint adventure
it without question disposes of the issue that the relationship w~s that of master and servant. In other words,
if the court found that the relationship was that of master and servant, it would not be necessary to say it was
not that of a joint adventure. Therefore, the finding
of the court that the relationship was that of a joint adventure is responsive and disposes of the contention of
the appellant in said paragraphs.
Paragraphs five, six, seven and eight of the Amended
Answer and Counterclaim grow out of the contractual
relationship of the appellant's allegations of the relationship of master and servant. If there was no such
relationship, then, of course, the contention of the a.p-
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pellant as set forth in paragraphs five, six, seven and
eight fall of their own weight, and there is no necessity
of the finding of the court negativing the allegations
thereof.

The san1e argument goes to paragraphs nine,

ten and e!even of appellant's Amended ·Complaint and
Counterclaim.
In respect to the fourth defense and counterclaim,
the appellant again set~ forth the same contentions as
it has in its Amended Complaint, that of the relationship of master and servant. Its fourth defense is merely
as to a particular job, that is, the Fort Douglas J.ob. The
fact that the court found that the relationship was that
of a joint adventure disposes of the issue that there was
the relationship of master and servant and, therefore,
the breach of the relationship of master and servant, of
course, falls of its own weight. There can be no breach
of duty of the master and servant relationship, as the
court found that none existed.
The Conclusions of Law are responsive to the Findings of Fact as made and entered by the court. The
findings of the court, that the acts of the parties in res·pect to the transactions involved were that of a joint
adventure in and of itself, negatives the relationship of
master and servant. Therefore, any acts complained of
by the appellant, growing out of the relationship of master and servant, and which is contrary to the finding of the
court of that of joint adventure, falls of its own weight.
The appellant in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim
admits that the relationship alleged by him pertains to
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the same transactions as alleged by the plaintiffs and
respondents in their Amended Complaint in which it is
alleged that that relationship was one of a joint adventure. The fact that the court finds that the relation·ship alleged hy the plaintiffs was one of joint adventure,
whereas the plaintiffs and respondents in their Amended
Complaint refer to the word ''partnership", does not
in any way change the situation between the parties.
In the case of Wells v. B. E. Porter Estate, 27·2 P.
1041, the following statement is made by the court:
''Appellant cla;ims that the findings do not cover
all the issues made by the pleadings, and particularly those arising under its affirmative defense.
The court found expressly upon all the issues
made by the amended complaint and the denials
of the answer. These findings are inconsistent
with the allegations of appellant '.s affirmative defense. They therefore were sufficient, and it was
unnecessary to make particular findings as to the
issues made by the affirmative allegations of the
answer.''
In the cas.e of Kendrick v. Gould, 197 P. 681, it was
stated:
''Although a ·special defense may be set up in the
answer, if there is not evidence to support it the
appellate court must conclude that any finding
whieh could have been made would have been
adverse to defendant on that issue, to that, under
such circumstances, the failure to find thereon
does not require a reversal.''
We feel that the case of Phillips v. Stark, 223 P. 443,
is ·squarely in 'point. T.hat case was an action on a con-
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tract, in which the defendant denied the allegations of
the complaint and set up a contract different from that
alleged by plaintiff and pleaded the rescission thereof;
court's failure to find on issue of rescission held not
error, in view of findings that the parties entered into
the contract pleaded by plaintiff, and that defendant
had violated such contract, ·since the court, in making
such findings, found by implication that the contract
alleged in the answer waa not made, and the question
of whether such contract was rescinded therefore became
immaterial.
In the case before us, the plaintiffs and respondents
plead a certain contract of joint adventure and the defendant and appellant denied the same, alleging a master
and servant relationship. The court by finding in favor
of the plaintiffs and respondents of a relationship of a
joint adventure iby implication negatives any relationship of that of master and servant and, therefore, a
specific finding upon any issue with respect to damages
suffered as a result of a relationship which the court by
implication negatives, is immaterial. Therefore, a finding on such points is not necessary.
As we interpret the contention of the appellant, it
is to the effect that the court should find that there was
no relationship of master and servant 'between the parties
on the transactions involved, and we assume negative
the various other allegations arising out of the contractual relationship as alleged of master and servant.
This, of course, is not necessary in view of the fact that
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the court found the opposite to he true; that is, that of
joint adventure. It would only he superfluous and certainly unnecessary to set forth that there was no master
and servant relationship. The court did that, and when
it found there was a joint adventure, thereby refused to
accept the contention of the appellant and in substance
negativing the same.
REsPONDENTs' THIRD AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

''A party who, without being intere~ted in property, is by agreement to receive as compensation
for his services, and only as compensation, a certain proportion of the profits, and is neither held
out to the world as a partner nor, through the
negligence of the owner permitted to hold himself out to the world as a partner, is not a partner
either as to the owner of third persons. The
.court failed to give effect to this principle by an
appropriate finding of fact upon evidence responsive to the issues but in its remarks and rulings from the bench disregarded the same.''
It is the further contention of the appellant that the
court erred in failing to give effect to the principle that
a party who, without being an interested party, is by
agreement to receive as compensation for his services,
and only as compensation, a share in proportion of the
profit,s, and is neither held out to the world as a partner
nor, through the negligence of the owner, permitted to
hold himself out to the world as a partner, is not a
partner either as to the owner or third persons.
In the first place, the court did not find that there
was a partnership relationship, 1but found that in respect
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to the transactions involved that there is a relationship
of that of joint adventure. In other words, !it is the
contention of the appellant, as we interpret it from this
Assig111nent of Errors, that the evidence is such that the
court should have found that there was no partnership
agreement, and also, no doubt, a joint adventure. Without referring· to the testimony of Mr. Dunkley, one of
the respondents and plaintiffs herein, the fact that there
was a joint adventure on the transactions involved was
admitted and proved by the appellant and defendant
himself. The court interrogated Mr. Newman. (Tr. 147,
148, 149 and 150) In answer to the interrogations of the
court, :Mr. Newman made the express statements that he
agreed to share profits with Mr. Dunkley and Mr. Huber
on the Hill Field Jab, The :McKee Job, The Poulson
Job, the Supply Depot Job, the Fort Douglas Job, and
the Harrison-Dorman Job. Mr. Newman further stated
that on these jobs the profits were to be split one-third
to Mr. Dunkley, one-third to Mr. Huber, and one-third
to himself. The profits to be split, however, after taking
out the rental for the equipment used; that Huber and
Dunkley would do the supervising.
At page 116 of the Transcript, a significant statement is made by Mr. Newman ~in respect to the Hospital
Job, as follows :
Q. Now, when you found out you were going to
make money on the hospital job, that is when you ceased
to want these 'boys as partners, isn't it~

A.

That is right.
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As a matter of fact, the joint adventure of the parties was admitted by defendant's counsel, Mr. Morris·sey.
(Tr. 250-251)
THE CounT:
I think the re·cord-perhaps :Mr.
Callister got this into the record, ·but to make
sure, the court would like to say that it is admitted by all parties that Mr. Newman and Mr.
Dunkley at least, were agreed that the joint venture would terminate on September 3rd.
MR. CALLISTER: I think that is right, your honor,
and we will so ·stipulate.
MR. MoRRISSEY : Y:es.
THE CouR'i':
With that then in the record, I will
sustain the obje-ction.

It was the contention of the ·plaintiffs that Mr. Huber
was a party of the joint adventure after September 3,
1943. However, the court found that there was only a
joint adventure as to September 3, 1943, as stipulated
by ·counsel as set forth above. I do not and cannot understand how the appellant and defendant can now come
before this court and contend there was no partnership
or joint adventure when it expressly so stipulated in
open court.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the plaintiffs
and respondents and appellant and defendant entered
into a contractual relationship on certain jobs, the terms
of which were as alleged in the plaintiffs' amended complaint. That is, that the three parties involved were to
take jobs from time to time; that any machinery and
equipment which was furnished was to receive a rental
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price the1·efor; and the profits, if any, or losses, were
to be divided equally among the three parties. Pursuant
to this arrangement which was entered into in the month
of April, 1942, many jobs were entered into. (Tr. 3 to 10,
inclusive.) On the Hospital Job, as the same is termed,
as well as the Harrison-Dorman job, the plaintiffs and
respondents had an insurance policy with the 8tate Insurance Fund for compensation insurance on the employees that were employed on these two johs. (Tr. 10,
11, 12, and 13) That premiums were paid in accordance
with the rules and regulations of the State Institance
Fund by these plaintiffs. This policy is known as Exhibit "A" in the transcript. (Tr. 14) The evidence is
conclusive that funds were put into an account by all
these parties, that is, the plaintiffs and defendant, which
moneys were paid to employees on the Hospital Job. (Tr.
16)
Ne-wman, after persistent efforts by the court to
elicit the facts from him, admitted that the 'plaintiffs and
respondents worked on the Hospital Job the same as they
had on the other jobs enumerated in the complaint for
approximately two and one-half to three weeks. (Tr.154)
Newman, who had changed his testimony from time to
time particularly from that which he had sworn to under
oath, in his amended answer, tried to have the court believe that he hired Mr. Huber and Mr. Dunkley on the
Hospital Job. (Tr. 163) That he hired Mr. Huber as
his foreman, notwithstanding the fact he claimed they
were incompetent. Employees do not advance their own
money to pay for employees of their employer, not do
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they carry compensation and do the things that were
done 'in this case. The most significant statement that
Newman ·could have made was to the effect that after
he found out he was going to make money on the Hospital Job he did not want them as partners any more.
On those j01bs on which money was supposed to be lost
they were his partners, but when any money was to be
made, then they ceased to be his partners or to be in
the joint enterprise with him. We refer this court to
Transcript 182 in which the court interrogated Newman
further. At this juncture the court was on the verge of
taking action against Newman for testifying diam-etrically opposite to the facts plead in his amended answer
under oath.
FouRTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The court erred in its ·conclusions from the bench
that these were joint ventures on all these jobs
mentioned in the ·complaint, that is the railroad
job, the hospital job and the Harrison-Dorman
joh; the hospital joh up to 1Sept. 3rd, ·because
there were no written findings of fact upon evidence within the issues made or filed by the court
with conclusions of law, and decree to account,
made, filed or entered either before or after said
conclusions from the 'bench. And the court erred
in proceedings to the appointment of a referee
in the absence of said jurisdictional pre-requisites.''
The defendant and appellant is raising the same question as was raised in his .First and Third Assignments of
Error. We refer this cour1 to the Gibbs case heretofore
cited; also statements made by defendant and appellant's
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counsel adn1itting· joint venture heretofore quoted. This
court had the rig-ht to order an accounting without first
making- Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Decree deter1nining- that a joint adventure existed. The
fact that the court in its opinion felt that a joint adventure existed and so found in its order heretofore referred
to was sufficient and it had a right to proceed to an accounting.
FIFTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The court further erred in its order of reference,
in that, neither by such order of reference, nor
by any decree to account, nor otherwise, did the
court require the parties to plead in accounting
by serving and filing of any statement of account,
counter statement, objections or exceptions to
specific items of account by either party upon
the other, so as to produce an issue of fact for
trial, limiting and defining the scope of the evidence upon the trial of such issue on issues. A
pleading, petition, affidavit or statement of claim
or account of some kind or character is essential
to confer jurisdiction upon a court to conduct a
trial of a question of fact or law."
In this Assignment of Error the defendant and a;ppellant again contends that the action of the court proceeding to an accounting was error in that there was no
Findings of Fact, or Conclusions based upon evidence
within the issues and the pleadings establishing partner·ship or other relationship or any breach of duty arising
therefrom, and no decree ordering that either party
aoooun t to the other.
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The defel1dant and appellant in its Brief (Page 55)
further st~tes that had Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree to ~ccount been previously ma<le it
would have required that the party liable be decreed to
account forthwith, file a statement of his. account with
the opposing party, showing separately the debits and
credits; that is, the receipts and disbursements. This
is not the law in this jurisdiction and we again refer the
court to the Gibbs case, (Supra). This court in that
case stated with approval.the following:

'' * * * In some jurisdictions the trial court may,
whenever neces·sary, direct an accounting, either
with or without the entry of an interlocutory
judgment, and may take the proof itself or make
a reference therefor. * * ill'"
In view of the fact that this ·court has held that an interlocutory judgment and decree is not necessary before
the court may take an accounting, it necessarily follows
that pleadings or statements of account need not be
formally fil~d. If the cou;rt may take the proof itself
it ~ertai11ly has a right to reqitilire the .defendant and
appellant to produce books and aeeounts. It may ask
th~ asflist.an~e to pr~pare a.;ud corr~lat~ the a~ounts
and ho.o~s :Of tl;le p;;trty fpr presentation to the .court,
this b~ing ~one, of :eours~, to expedite tb.e matter.
This oou.;rt stated with approval in the Gi'bhs ease,
supra, th.e following :
'' * * * 'rhe t;rial j;udge .~;t~nounced his views as t·o
certain issues, hut not having 1Jlade findings or
entered a decree, the whole matter is still before
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him, and he n1ay reach a different conclusion when
the case is finally submitted. The 1nanner in which
he proceeds with the trial is discretionary and
within jurisdiction. His discretion may not be
controlled by this court. * * * ''
Certainly the District Court did not err in its proceedings when it did not make Findings, Conclusions or Decree, but proceeded to have the account taken. Certainly
no pleading ~is essential or necessary other than that
originally filed in view of the statements by this court
in th~ Gibbs case, supra. No Findings of Fact or Conclusiops of Law or Decree are essential or necessary
before the court could proceed to an accounting. Ther~
fore, it had a right to prcceed to an accounting based
upon the original pleadings. As this court further said
in the Gibbs case:
"a court of equity, assuming jurisdiction to determine whether assignment ·contracts should be
set aside, ordinarily has jurisdiction to settle
whole controversy, and if it finds contracts void,
to require accounting of m.oneys received by defendants during time property was in their possession and to enter judgment for return of property assigned, and for any amount found to hav~
been ·collected to which plaintiff is entitled."
In the case of Probst v. Bearman, (01da.) 183 Pac.
886, the plaintiff sued for the c~ncellation of an oil and
gas lease. After determining the main issue in the case
in favor of the plaintiff the Court proeeeded with the
trial and requ[red the defendant to account for the oil
and gas produced on the lease.d premises during the
litigation, the Court holdjng that the accounting was
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ancillary to the main cause of action. The Court held
in this case that when the plaintiff succeeded in cancelling the lease his right to the oil and gas produced on the
premises during the litigation followed as a natural
sequence, and in support of its holding cited 1 C. J.
616 (1Supra).
Defendant and appellant's whole basis for reversal
as we see it is upon the theory that the court did not first
make and enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree, and, therefore, could not order an accounting. The Gibhs case (!Supra) definitely disposes of that
issue.
SrxTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

''The court erred for the same rea·sons last specified in proceedings to a trial of unknown. issues,
or no issues of fact defined by any pleading of
the parties, and to hear evidence directed to no
'specific issue of fact, and upon no written pleadings, and to make findings thereon, sounding in
accounting. Thereby acting without jurisdiction.''
The defendant's sixth assignment of error is in substance the same as that of the fifth, and~ therefore, tit is
unnecessary for us to amplify our argument further in
respect to the sixth assignment of error.
SEVENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The court erred in its said proceedings in receiving or considering any evidence or testimony
because it was proceeding without jurisdiction for
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the reasons already stated, and es·pecially in receiving in evidence and in taking judicial notice of
any of the contents of the document.''
The defendant and appellant again refers to the same
~ntention

that the court proceeded without jurisdiction

for the reasons stated in its other assignments of error.
That is, that the court could not proceed to an accounting until it had made its Findings of Fact, Conclustions
of Law and Decree. 'Ve have heretofore discussed this
at length. It further states that the court erred in receiving evidence and taking judicial notice of plaintiff
and respondents' Exhibit "E ", which was Wallace
Dansie's report. This report was submitted without objection from the defendant and appellant. When the
same was offered in evidence (Tr. 201) Mr. Morrissey,
attorney for the defendant and appellant, stated that it
c.ould he filed and thereby making no objection to the
same being received by the court. We must remember
that this is a case in which the defendant and appellant
from the beginning insisted there was no joint adventure,
but subsequently upon cross examination admitted the
same. That in order to expedite the trial of this cause
the court saw fit to refer this matter. 1\.t transcript 201
Mr. Dansie stated that he asked them (referring to all
the parties; that is, the defendant and the plaintiffs) for
their books, and that there was submitted to him all the
books and records of the enterprise, on the jobs in question in this controversy. After Mr. Dansie bad gone
over the books as submitted to him, he made his report
of which he served copies upon the parties who had ample
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opportunity to determine the correctne-ss ef the same.
Notice was served upon the defendant and appellant
(Tr. on Appeal 80) giving them notice that the same
wou:ld be submitted to the court and notifying them that
if' they had any obje·ctio:n:s to the same to present the
same at that ti:tne. The defendant and appellant saw fit
to· make no oJbjections to the same, and as he:retofdte
stated, did not object to- the report heing filed. There
was no evidence irttr.odnced that the eomputation·s a~
found by Mr. nansie were inoorrecf. T1:1e report of Mr.
Dansie ref~rted to as plaintiff's Exhibit ''E" did nO't
attempt to :tesoi\Te the issues df fact in favc:tr of any
patty. The defendant a:t no time eontended at the ttial,
not are we to find from his Brief that the figures lis
f.oulid by Mr. :D.anste were incottect. That the· ·c6ttrt upon
i'eceiVing n.o ohjeefi()Iis from the defendant, teceived the
same. Phrlnti:rf.s' Exlrlbit "E", tlie repdrt of :Mr.Da:tisie,
was subject to the cross•exam:ination: of the defend:attt
as id its -co:i"tectnes:s. Certainly, to· expedite a matter
f:Jf this kind the court has· a tight to reqttest assistanc~
from art accountEtnt, and where his report is admitted
without objections, no error has been ·eommitted by the
court. The ap·pointmertt of :Mt. Dansie was for the pitrP'Ose of having a bo·6kkeepet correlate and reduce to an
ultimate figure the debits and credits of the parties from
the baoks given to Mr. Dansie by the parties involved.
That statement of debits a·nd cr~dits was filed withbtit
o'bjection. At transcript 208 t:fle r~cord ~learly shows
that ~tll tbe records were pt·~sent at the heatin~. Tbe
attorney for the plaintiffs and respd:ndents requested that
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all records be brought at the hearing. (Tr. 208) The
records were there for the purpose of examination by all
parties in the event they did not agree with the compilation of the san1e by .Mr. Dansie. The court gave all parties the opportunity to question l\ir. Dansie in respect
to his report. The plaintiffs and respondents did not
agree with the figures of Mr. Dansie in one respect and,
therefore, introduced evidence by Mr. Dunkley, one of
the plaintiffs herein (Tr. 223, 224, 225) showing the
amount of loads and yardage on the hospital job. Mr.
Dunkley's testimony in respect to the yardage on the Hospital job is uncontradicted by any testimony whatsover
and the court saw fit to accept the same, which was
proper.
EIGHTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The said referee report, plaintiffs' exhibit A,
was void on its face, and on the face of the record
for the reasons that:
(a) The author thereof, Mr. Dansie never qualified by taking the oath required by Utah Const.
Art. VI, Sec. 10 and Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 10427-7,
(b) The author thereof never proceeded in conformity to Utah Annot. Code, 1943, 104-27-6, to
give notice to the parties, conduct a trial, hear
sworn testimony, make findings of fact and conclu~ions of law, and to report the results thereof
to the court,
(c) The author thereof proceeded, on the contrary
to interview various persons ex parte, out of the
.presence of defendant and his counsel, to make
private inquiries, and to receive and consider unsworn hearsay statements, oral and written, from
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various unknown persons; and to receive and consider the contents of sundry written books, records and documents submitted to him by plaintiffs
and by unknown persons without the oaths of
attesHng witness or witnesses, and out of the
presence of defendant and his counsel; and to
compile a report based upon unsworn hearsay
statements of persons, books or documents unknown to the defendant,
(d) By these and other steps and proceedin~s unknown to and forbidden by law the author of the
report purported to make and ·state an account
wherein and whereby he resolved all questions and
dou'bts in his mind against the defendant and in
favor of the plaintiffs, and refused to consider
statements of claim ·by third persons which, if
allowable, were just claims in accounting in the
nature of operating expenses which must first be
deducted from gross income, 'before striking any
·balance in accounting,
(e) The author of said report was never lawfully
appointed referee to take or state an account, because the court was without jurisdiction to make
the order of appointment, in the absence of any
prior findings of fact and decree to account; and
also because there were no written pleadings or
is·sues defining the issues and limiting proofs in
accounting to specific items of debit or credit,
charge or countercharge in account.~'
These plaintiffs and respondents assert that the
referee's report, plaintiffs' Exhibit "E'', was not void
on its face for any reasons whatsoever.

The defendant

and appellant contends that the author thereof, Mr.
Dansie, never qualified by taking the oath required by
the laws of Utah. 'l,here is nothing in tl1e record whatsoever showing that Mr. Dansie did not take the oath or
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that he did take the oath of office. The record shows that
Mr. Dansie was sworn as a witness (Tr. 194) at the
time he was put on the stand in respect to his report to
identify the san1e and to submit to cross examination
regarding· the same. The record is silent as to his being
sworn in any other respect. vV e refer this court to 45
Am. Jur. Page 556, Section 19, in which it is stated as
follows:
"\Vhere the record is silent on the question
whether the referee was sworn, the presumption
is that he took the oath as prescribed by law, slince
all officers are presumed to do their duty.''
The question whether the referee was sworn or took
his oath was never raised by defendant and appellant at
the trial, and he had ample opportunity to do so if he
desired. If the defendant and appellant had had an objection he ·should have made the same at the trial. An
objection that the referee was not sworn is waived by
appearing and going to trial. See 3 Am. Jur. Page 417,
Section 872, Note 16. It is fundamental that the failure
of an injured party to call the attentrion of the trial court
to the alleged error at the time it occurs, or at least when
it is still in the power ·Of the trial court to correct it,
amounts ordinarily to a waiver of the error or creates an
estoppel against bringing it to the attention of the trial
court. See 3 Am. Jur. Page 417, 8ection 872.
The defendant and appellant further contends that
Mr. Dansie proceeded contrary to the laws of Utah writh
respect to ·conducting a trial, hearing testimony, etc.
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Further, that the referee did not make any findings. We
are not so concerned with the form of findings as to the
fact that findings were made and that they were of benefit to the court, which it ·could adopt in whole or in part.
Such findings as made ·by Mr. Dansie were very intelligent, helpful and correct. They were such findings that
the court saw fit to adopt with some Inod[fication. It
is the general rule that the master's findings should be
sustained unless they are manifestly, palpaJbly, or clearly appears to have been error or mistake upon his part.
8ee 3 Am. Jur. Page 48'2, Section 913, Note 3. Certainly
there is no manifest or even a slight indication of error
in the report of Mr. Dansie. The defendant and appellant
was given every opportunity to question the referee on
hls report, to examine the same, to make objections and
fully 'Protect his interests in every way. The fact tbat
he did not do so is ample evidence that he admitted th~
correctness of the same. If there was error at that tinw
why was it not raised~ Why raise error, (which we
strenuously contend does not nor did not exist) now that
could have been raised in the event that such had been
llllade at the proper time before the trial court f
When evidence is not reported in the referee's findings, the findings are nevertheless final and cannot be
disturbed on appeal. ~See 3 Am. Jur. Page 42, Section
913, Note 9.

.A referee should report the facts found and not the
testimony. Excep-t where the testimony is excepted to,
and then the ground of objection and the decision thereon
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should be stated. He is not required to state every subsidiary circumstance supporting his ultimate conclusion
as to the facts, nor to summarize evidence not given
credence by hin1, nor to narrate n1atters having no
probative force in his final determination.
.Jur. Page 567, Section 36.

See 45 Am.

As stated before, defendant and appellant saw fit
to consent that the report be filed; saw fit to make no
objections to its correctness; had opportunity to cross
examine referee on all points. However, he did so on
some portions of the same. It is fundamental that if a
party desires to challenge the findings of the referee
he should do so within the proper time and if he fails
to do so and the report is confirmed, he is bound by the
findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or escape the legal consequences flowing therefrom.
See 45 An1. Jur. Page 570, Section 39, Sections 14 and
15. A report and obje·ctions filed thereto make an issue.
If no objections are filed there· is no issue in respect to
the findings.
The referee was lawfully appointed, made his report; the court saw fit to adopt in substance the whole
thereof, making some changes after hearing evidence.
We take the position that if there was error, which we
em·phatically contend there was not, in respect to the
appointment and proceedings of the referee, then defendant and appellant had ample opportunity to make
his objections ; he had ample opportunity to do so. He
saw fit at the time of the trial not to make objections
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and, therefore, he cannot now at this time make objections that he had ample opportunity to make at the trial
of this cause.
The plaintiffs and respondents did not agree with
the numbers of yards as reported hy :Mr. Dansie and
thereby put on evidence by Mr. Dunkley. {Tr. 233) Mr.
Dunkley testified to the exact amount of yardage, which
tHstimony the court accepted and received and thereby
modified the referee's report in respect thereto. Mr.
Newman was present in court with his books, had ample
opportunity to cross examine Mr. Dunkley and to submit
evidence contrary thereto if Mr. Dunkley was in error.
This he did not do, the reasons being that the testimony
of Mr. Dunkely was correct in respect to the amount of
yardage hauled at the Hospital J o·b. This evidence being
uncontroverted, the court had the perfect right to accept
the figure as being correct. Mr. Newman had ample opportunity to show that the 69c paid per cubic yard was
incorrect and that the 59c figure should be us·ed. He
had the contracts in ·court. It is uncontroverted that 69c
was the contract price for the cubic yards of dirt to be
hauled on the Hospital Job. The mere fact that the
original contract was 5·9c, but later changed to 69c, does
not deprive the plaintiffs and respondents as ·members
of the joint adventure from re-ceiving the increase. Why
should Mr. Newman benefit at the expense of his fellow
members in the joint adventure~
The defendant and appellant further contends that
the report did not take into consideration claims of third
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parties in arriving at the balance due between the parties; that said clain1s were allowable. This, of course,
is ridiculous. The members of the joint adventure are
liable for the obligations of the joint adventure. The
fact that certain parties claim amounts due that have
not b~en paid by any n1ember of the joint adventure in
an accounting cannot be allowed in favor of one of the
members of that joint adventure. In other words, the
defendant and appellant wanted the trial court to deduct
from the amount due from him to the plaintiffs and respondents claims of third parties which he had not paid
and was no more liable for than the other two members
of the joint adventure. The plaintiffs and respondents
denied that any third party claims were proper and
insisted they were not due and owing. In other words,
a controversy existed between plaintiffs and respondents
and defendant and appellant in respect to whether claims
of third parties which were not taken into account by
Mr. Dansie should be paid. It is inconceivable to see
upon what theory the trial court could allow these claims
of third parties, when not paid by Mr. Newman, and
when all members of the joint adventure were responsible therefor. The court had a perfect right to refuse to
take into consideration in allowing the account the contested claim of the third parties in view of the fact that
the members thereof were not in agreement that any
amount was due and owing.
NrNTH AssiGNMENT' OF ERROR

''The findings of fact made by the court as a reof the attempted accounting without or in

~sult
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ex<"ess of jurisdiction, insofar as they attempted
to respond to the original issues of partnership
·or employee relationship between the parties and
duty to account, were too late, were insufficient
and unresponsive to mnst of the issues in that
respect in the amended complaint and amended
answer and counter-claiin, and did not confer
jurisdiction in accounting.''
It is well settled that where an accounting is necessary
to the full determination of a controvel'Sy, a Court will
proceed to hear it so that the whole controversy may be
determined in one action.
"Where a court of equity assumes jurisdiction of
a controversy on some ground other than the
accounting involved, it will, as a general rule,
where an accounting is necessary to a full settlement of the controversy, proceed to decree it, and
will settle the whole controver.sy, even to the extent of adjudicating· matters of purely legal coglllizance. If, however, the allegations of the bill
creating equitable cognizance are not sustained,
the jurisdiction will follow, and a. mere demand
. for an account, in the absence of other or equitable circumstances, will not bP enough to require
the retention of the cause.'' 1 C. J. 616.
TENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The finding of fact were unlawful because made
in response to no pleading, and no definite issue
defining and limiting proofs, and because the
same were repugnant to the proofs accepted and
heard ·by the court without any issues in accounting.,
We refer to the citation set forth under assignment
nine and ·statement to answer assignment of error ten.
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ELEVENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

''The finding·s of fact were unlawful and void because it rested almost entirely upon the void report of ,Mr. Dansie acting as referee and containing only the results of unsworn hearsay statements of various persons received out of the
presence of defendant. \Vithout said hearsay
report there was no evidence to support the findings as to profits earned, items deductible, or
balance proposed to be divided.''
We again repeat that Mr. Dansie as an accountant and
bookkeeper compiled certain information from the books
and records of the parties for the purpose of expediting
this matter. He brought the same to the court and stated
that he took them from the records of the defendant
and plaintiffs. His compilation of the books was accepted
without objection by any of the parties. He was doing
nothing more than being of assistance to the court and
reducing to concrete form the debits and credits of the
various parties so that the same could be submitted to
the court and the parties have an opportunity of contesting any part of the same. They elected not to do so
and accepted the same without objection.
TwELFTH

AssiG ~MENT m•· Ennon

''The court erred in refusing to consider evidence
lbefore it and in rejecting other like evidence,
showing that defendant waR injuriously debited
in accounting with ten cents per cubic yard on
72.676.05 cubic yards of material hauled by Newman on the hospital job, and plaintiffs credited
therewith, for which Newman paid and performed
the sole consideration in the hanlage thereof.''
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There is a1nple evidence to support the finding of the
court as to the number of cubic yards hauled on the
Hospital Fill Job. Mr. Newman received 69c per ctrbic
yard and, therefore, the parties to the joint adventure
were entitled to the same as he received.
THIRTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

"The trial court in its findings and rulings with
respect to an asserted change order made in defendant Newman's contract with the government
on the hospital jo:b and in crediting plaintiffs with
two-thirds of the benefit thereof in which they had
no interest.''
The change order made in favor of Mr. Newman, of
cours·e, went to the benefit of the other members of the
joint adventure. How can a party to a joint adventure
c-ontend that he is entitled to more than the other members when he has admitted that they were to divide onethird each.
FouRTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

''The trial court erred in making conditional findings, and in requiring the giving or filing by defendant, or by either party, of ~n indetnnity bond
as a· condition to relief from, or abatem·ent of,
any portion thereof.''
We cannot understand the objection iby the .defendant and appellant .as set forth in the above assignment
of ·err.or to the judgment of the court. The conditions
as set forth therein was for the .sole benefit of the defendant and appellant. He cannot be prejudiced as a
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result of the same in any respect. The judg·rnent simply
stated that these plaintiffs and respondents could not
execute on the full arnount of the judg1nent unless and
until it had given to the defendant an indemnity bond
in the ·Sum of $7 ,000.00, to protect it against any claims
by third parties as set forth therein, and in addition, to
renegotiation of contracts. This meant that a portion of
the judgment, that is, $6,808.00, the plaintiffs and respondents could not execute upon until such time as this
bond was delivered. It simply gave the defendant and
.appellant the rig·ht and option to require this bond if it
.so desired; and in fairness to the plaintiffs, the defendant must give to them an indemnity bond, also. The
defendant did not have to put up a bond, and if he refused to do so the plaintiffs and respondents would then
have a right to execute upon the full amount of the
judgment. The only parties who could have been prejudiced in any way were the plaintiffs and respondents.
The court in this case had a right to make a condition, if
it so desired, in fairness to all parties, and when the defendant and appellant was not prejudiced, it certainly
could not complain.
FIFTEENTH AssiGNMENT OF ERROR

''The final judgment was void for each of the reasons hereinbefore specified with respect to the
issues, evidence and findings, and because unsupported ·by issues or evidence. Also because of its
requirement that a ·bond or bonds be filed as a
condition to relief from a portion thereof.''
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This assignment is what may be termed a "catch all"
to follow the other assignments of error set forth in
plaintiffs' brief. He sets forth in this assignment that
the judgment was void because of its 1·equirement that
a bond or !bonds he filed as a condition to relief from a
portion thereof. .Again we respectfully inform this court
that under the terms of the judgment the only party who
could complain would be the plaintiffs and respondents .
.All it gave was the right and option to the defendant, if
he so de,sired, to require a bond fron1 these plaintiffs
and respondents to indemnify him, before they could
execute on the whole thereof. It was nothing more than
an option which he ·could exercise or not, as he saw fit.
Under no conditions or circumstances could he be prejudiced or injured in any way. Therefore, he cannot
complain. We are at a loss to understand why he should
complain against a condition which was made for his
sole benefit and use, with the option to accept it or not,
as he saw fit.

The court properly concluded that there was a joint
adventure between the parties hereto inasmuch as the
defendant and appellant, through his eounsel, admitted
the same; that an accounting was, therefore,_ in order
and proceeded to take the same. That the same was
taken properly and in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah. It seems odd that the defendant
and appellant would not at the trial of this case raisei the
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same objections that he has now raised ,before this Appellate Court when he had ample opportunity to do so.
The fact that this defendant and appellant swore under
oath in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim that no
such relationship existed; and then admitted the same,
proves to us that he is attempting in every way to find
some technicality to avoid payment of that which is due
his fellow members of a joint adventure. We respectfully
submit that the court did not err in any respect, and that
the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

Loms H.

CALLISTER,

Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
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